This paper shows that the BB84 protocol with random privacy amplification is secure with a higher key rate than Mayers' estimate with the same error rate. Consequently, the tolerable error rate of this protocol is increased from 7.5 % to 11 %. We also extend this method to the case of estimating error rates separately in each basis, which enables us to securely share a longer key.
I. INTRODUCTION
The BB84 protocol is the first quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, which was proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1] . Unlike conventional cryptographies that rely on the conjectured difficulty of computing certain functions, the security of QKD is guaranteed by the postulate of quantum mechanics. In the BB84 protocol, the participants (Alice and Bob) agree on a secret key about which any eavesdropper (Eve) can obtain little information. The security proof of this protocol against arbitrary eavesdropping strategies was first proved by Mayers [5] , and a simple proof was later shown by Shor and Preskill [2] .
In the BB84 protocol, two linear codes C 1 and C 2 are employed to share a secret key. C 1 is used for error correction, and C 2 is used for privacy amplification. Error correction is performed to share the same key, which is not necessarily secret. Privacy amplification is performed to extract a shorter secret key. To share the same secret key, C 2 must be a subcode of C 1 , and the decoding error probability of C 1 and C ⊥ 2 as a CSS code must be small. For the key distribution protocol to be practical, we require the linear code C 1 to be efficiently decodeable. However, it is difficult to find a pair of linear codes C 1 and C 2 that satisfy these conditions. Because we do not have to decode C ⊥ 2 , it is sufficient that C ⊥ 2 is a randomly chosen code whose decoding error probability is small with the maximum likelihood decoding. Mayers showed that if one determines C 1 and chooses C 2 with rate H(2p) at random from subcodes of C 1 , the minimum Hamming weight of C ⊥ 2 \C ⊥ 1 is greater than pn with high probability, where p is an estimated error rate and H(·) is the binary entropy function [5, Lemma 4] . Consequently, the decoding error probability of C ⊥ 2 as a part of a CSS code is small. With this method, we can share a key with the key rate 1 − H(p) − H(2p), and the protocol can tolerate error rates up to 7.5%.
However, by evaluating directly the decoding error probability of C ⊥ 2 instead of the minimum Hamming weight, we can decrease the rate of C 2 while maintaining the security of the protocol. This paper shows that when one chooses C 2 with rate H(p) at random from subcodes of C 1 , the decoding error probability of C ⊥ 2 as a part of a CSS code is exponentially small with high probability. Consequently, when we choose a code C 2 at random in the BB84 protocol, according to our evaluation of decoding error probability, we can share a key with the key rate 1 − 2H(p) and the protocol can tolerate error rates up to 11%.
To share a key more efficiently, it is known that we should estimate error rates, p 0 and p 1 , separately in two basis [7] , [8] . This paper also shows that if one chooses C 2 of a rate H(p0)+H(p1) 2 at random from subcodes of C 1 , the decoding error probability of C ⊥ 2 as a part of a CSS code is exponentially small with high probability.
It is also known that QKD protocols with two-way classical communications can tolerate higher error rate than QKD protocols with one-way classical communications. The tolerable error rates are 18.9% in [7] , 20% in [11] , and 26% in [10] . Our result on random privacy amplification is also applicable for those protocols, because they perform error correction and privacy amplification after reducing the error rate with twoway classical communications. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the BB84 protocol, and present the required conditions on C 1 and C 2 . We also relate those conditions to the security of the BB84 protocol quantitatively. In Section III, the main theorem is proved. Concluding remarks are given in Section IV.
II. THE BB84 PROTOCOL
We consider the following BB84 protocol modified from [2] . As shown in [6] , [7] , [8] , we estimate error rates separately in two basis {|0 , |1 } and { |0 +|1
As is also mentioned in [2] , [6] , [7] , Alice and Bob agree on a random permutation π after transmission of the qubits and use the linear codes scrambled by π, where π scrambles the n-bit vector within first n 2 bits and latter n 2 bits respectively, i.e., π : (x 1 , · · · , x n 2 , y 1 , · · · , y n 2 ) → (x π1 (1) , · · · , x π1( n 2 ) , y π2 (1) , · · · , y π2( n 2 ) ), and π 1 , π 2 ∈ S n 2 are permutations on {1, · · · , n 2 }. By this procedure, we can securely share a key against general eavesdropping attacks with a linear code whose decoding error probability as a part of a CSS code is small over a BSC (Binary Symmetric Channel) [7, Lemmas 2, 3] .
A. The BB84 protocol
(1) Alice randomly select (4 + θ)n-bit strings k and a, and chooses a random permutation π. (2) Alice repeats the following procedures for 1 ≤ i ≤ (4 + θ)n. If a i = 0, she creates either state |0 for k i = 0 or |1 for k i = 1. If a i = 1, she creates either state |+ for k i = 0 or |− for k i = 1. We represent prepared states as
(3) Alice sends the resulting (4 + θ)n qubits |ϕ 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ϕ (4+θ)n to Bob. (4) Bob receives the (4 + θ)n qubits |φ 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |φ (4+θ)n . (5) Bob randomly select (4 + θ)n-bit string b. (6) Bob repeats the following procedures for
Then, measurement result, +1 and −1, corresponds tok i = 0 andk i = 1, respectively. After these procedures Bob obtainsk = (k 1 , · · · ,k (4+θ)n ). With high probability, at least 2n bits remain, and there are at least n bits where a i = b i = 0, and there are at least n bits where a i = b i = 1 (if not, abort the protocol). (9) Alice chooses n bits where a i = b i = 0, and divides them into two n 2 -bit strings, c 0 and d 0 . She chooses n bits where a i = b i = 1, and divides them into two then they obtain f 0 and f 1 . From f 0 , f 1 , Alice and Bob choose a pair of linear codes C 1 and C 2 that satisfy the conditions (a)-(c) in Section II-B. If there exists no such a pair of linear codes, then they abort the protocol. (11) Alice chooses a random codeword v from π(C 1 ) whose length is n, where π(C 1 ) is a code that all codewords in C 1 are permuted by π. She sends x = v + d with a public classical channel, where d is a concatenation of d 0 and d 1 . (12) Bob receives x = v + d and subtractsd from it. Then, he decodes v + e into a codewordv in π(C 1 ), where e is a concatenation of e 0 and e 1 , andd is a concatenation ofd 0 andd 1 . (13) Alice uses the coset of v + π(C 2 ) as a key, and Bob uses the coset ofv + π(C 2 ) as a key.
B. Security of the protocol
The security of the BB84 protocol can be proved by showing the security of the CSS code protocol (QKD using a CSS code) [6] . Maintaining the security, the BB84 protocol is related with the CSS code protocol. This kind of technique was first used in [2] , in which the BB84 protocol is related to the EPP (Entanglement Purification Protocol) protocol. As shown in [7, Lemma 3] , if C 1 and C 2 satisfy the following three conditions, then a shared key is secure against general eavesdropping attacks.
(a) C 2 ⊂ C 1 (b) If the crossover probability of the first n 2 bits of the BSC is smaller than or equal to p 0 and the crossover probability of the latter n 2 bits is smaller than or equal to p 1 , then the decoding error probability of C 1 as a part of a CSS code over the BSC, whose formal definition is given in Definition 2, is smaller than or equal to . (c) If the crossover probability of the first n 2 bits of the BSC is smaller than or equal to p 1 and the crossover probability of the latter n 2 bits is smaller than or equal to p 0 , then the decoding error probability of C ⊥ 2 as a part of a CSS code over the BSC is smaller than or equal to . We set p 0 and p 1 to p 0 = Q f0 (1)+δ and p 1 = Q f1 (1)+δ in step (10), where Q f0 , Q f1 are the types of f 0 ,f 1 (refer to [9] for the definition of the type), and δ and are sufficiently small positive numbers. Throughout this paper, we assume p 0 < 1 2 and p 1 < 1 2 . We stress that the decoding error probability of C 1 and C ⊥ 2 have to be small over any BSC with crossover probability below p 0 and crossover probability below p 1 , instead of a single BSC with crossover probabilities p 0 and p 1 . The necessity of such a requirement on decoding error probability is already observed in [6] , [7, Proof of Lemma 3] .
The security of the BB84 protocol is usually evaluated by the mutual information between a shared key and Eve's accessible information. In order to implement the BB84 protocol, the designer of the system has to find a pair of linear codes by which the mutual information between a shared key and Eve's accessible information is smaller than an acceptable level. To find such a pair of linear codes, we need a criterion according to which we can distinguish whether a particular pair of linear codes makes the mutual information smaller than an acceptable level.
In the security proof of [7] , it is proved that the security of the BB84 protocol against general eavesdropping attack is reduced to the security against uncorrelated Pauli attacks (Eve applies a random Pauli operator independently on each qubit sent through the channel). However, only a asymptotic upper bound on the mutual information is proved, and the authors do not present a sufficient condition for low mutual information on a pair of linear codes of a finite code length.
In the security proof of [6] , Hamada presents a condition on a pair of linear codes [6, Corollary 2] , and proves that the mutual information is upper bounded quantitatively by a pair of linear codes satisfying that condition. However, that condition does not aid choosing a suitable linear code, because we cannot easily decide whether a particular code satisfies it.
By upper bounding the mutual information by a function of the decoding error probability , we can find a pair of linear codes that makes the mutual information smaller than an acceptable level according to the conditions (a)-(c). Because evaluating an upper bound on the decoding error probability of a code is not difficult, the conditions (a)-(c) on a pair of linear codes are practically useful. The following theorem gives an upper bound on the mutual information as a function of the decoding error probability .
Theorem 1: If we use linear codes C 1 and C 2 that satisfy the conditions (a)-(c) in the BB84 protocol, then the mutual information between a shared key and Eve's accessible information (including messages exchanged over the classical channel) is upper bounded by
where the base of exp(·) is 2, Θ(δ 2 n) is given by
S denotes the random variable of the information transmitted through the public classical channel, U denotes the random variable of a shared key, i.e., the coset of v + π(C 2 ), and E denotes the random variable of Eve's eavesdropping result from transmitted qubits. This theorem is proved almost in the same way as [6, Appendix C]. Note that the upper bound of the mutual information is valid for finite n.
III. RANDOM PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
To implement the BB84 protocol, we need a linear code C 1 to be efficiently decodeable, which is used for error correction in step (12) . Under the conditions (a)-(c), it is difficult to find a pair of linear codes C 1 and C 2 of which C 1 is efficiently decodeable. On the other hand, since we do not decode C ⊥ 2 in the BB84 protocol, we can evaluate the condition (c) with an arbitrary decoding method. Therefore, first we choose a code C 1 that satisfies the condition (b) and is efficiently decodeable. Then we will find a code C 2 that satisfies the conditions (a) and (c). Given a code C 1 , choosing a code C 2 with the condition (a) is same as choosing a code C ⊥ 2 that satisfies (a ) C ⊥ 1 ⊂ C ⊥ 2 . If we fix a rate R lower than 1 − H(p 0 + p 1 ) and choose a code C ⊥ 2 of rate R at random with the condition (a ), with high probability the condition (c) will be satisfied [5, Lemma 4] . In this section, we will prove that if we fix a rate R lower than 1 − H(p0)+H(p1) 2 and choose a code C ⊥ 2 of rate R at random with the condition (a ), with high probability the condition (c) will be satisfied. Some ideas used in the proof are borrowed from [3] , [4] .
We present the main theorem in Section III-A, and the proof of this theorem in Section III-B. Then we consider the key rate of securely shared key in Section III-C, and compare our result with Mayers' in Section III-D.
A. The code for privacy amplification
Given a code C ⊥ 1 of dimension r, we consider how to choose a code C ⊥ 2 . Fix a rate R = r+m n < 1 − H(p0)+H(p1) 2 , and let
be the set from which we choose a code C ⊥ 2 . 1) Minimum conditional entropy decoding: To evaluate the decoding error probability, we employ the minimum conditional entropy decoding [6, Appendix B] . Let e be an error occurred in n bits binary vector, P ζ be the type of first n 2 bits of e, and P η be the type of latter n 2 bits of e. Then we define the conditional entropy of e as
In the minimum conditional entropy decoding, we find an estimated errorê that minimizes H c (ê) and has the same syndrome, i.e.,êH
2) The decoding process of a CSS code: We assume that only phase errors occur because we will consider the decoding process by C ⊥ 2 . Assume that a codeword |v + C 2 is sent and σ
z ⊗ · · · ⊗ σ en z , and e = (e 1 , · · · , e n ). Compute the syndrome eH T 2 and find an estimated errorê. Then, apply the unitary operator σ applied to a codeword of a CSS code |v + C 2 , then we have
If (v+w)·(e+ê) = 0 for all v+w ∈ C 1 , the codeword is left unchanged by multiplication of σ
1 , the errors are not estimated correctly but the received state will be corrected to the original state, and these errors do not yield decoding errors. In case of decoding a CSS code, we define the set of errors for each C ⊥ 2 , which cause decoding errors, as
Definition 2:
We define the decoding error probability of C ⊥ 2 as a part of a CSS code over a BSC whose crossover probability of first n 2 bits are p 1 and that of latter n 2 bits are p 0 as
where Q(e) is a probability that e occurs in a BSC whose crossover probability of first n 2 bits are p 1 and that of latter n 2 bits are p 0 . The decoding error probability of C 1 as a part of a CSS code is defined in the same way considering the decoding process of bit flip errors of a CSS code. Theorem 3: If we choose a code C ⊥ 2 at random from A m , for arbitrary µ > 0, we have
and |x| + = max{x, 0}. Note that min q0,q1 is taken over 0
Consequently, we can obtain a code C ⊥ 2 that satisfy the condition (c) with high probability by choosing a code at random from A m .
B. Proof of the theorem
Refer to [9] for the method of type used in this section. We also use the notation T n (P ζ ,Pη ) as the set of binary vectors whose type of first n 2 bits is P ζ and that of latter n 2 bits is P η . P 2 n 2 is the direct product of the sets of all possible types over {0, 1} n 2 , i.e., P n 2 × P n 2 . We classify E(C ⊥ 2 ) by the types in P 2 Pη) . First, we prove that if we choose a code C ⊥ 2 at random from A m , C ⊥ 2 satisfies the following property with high probability. Then we prove that the decoding error probability of C ⊥ 2 that satisfy the following property is small. Given arbitrary µ > 0, for all types (P ζ , P η ) ∈ P 2
To prove this, we evaluate the average of
Define the set of codes that cannot correct e as
and G as the set of bijective linear maps α on F n 2 that satisfies α(C ⊥ 1 ) = C ⊥ 1 . Then we have the following equalities:
, α, β ∈ G, β and C ⊥ 2 are fixed . Since there exists β ∈ G such that e = β(e) for arbitrary e and e ∈ F n 2 \C ⊥ 1 , |C m (e)| does not depend on e ∈ F n 2 \C ⊥ 1 and |C m (e)| =
From the definition, it is obvious that |C m (e)| = 0 for e ∈ C ⊥ 1 . Hence Using above definitions, we have
This inequality is obtained almost in the same way as the last inequalities in [4] .
From the union bound and the Chebychev inequality, we have
Next, we evaluate the decoding error probability of C ⊥ 2 ∈ A g (µ). Let p 0 ≤ p 0 and p 1 ≤ p 1 , and Q(e) be a probability that e occurs in a BSC whose crossover probability of first n 2 bits are p 1 and that of latter n 2 bits are p 0 . Then the decoding error probability of C ⊥ 2 as a part of a CSS code is
where E(R, p 0 , p 1 ) is defined in Eq (1). Lemma 4:
We omit the proof of this lemma for lack of space. From this lemma, ∀p 0 ≤ p 0 , ∀p 1 ≤ p 1 , we have
Then Theorem 3 is proved.
C. Achievable key rate
We proved that if we fix a code C ⊥ 1 and choose a code
at random with the condition C ⊥ 1 ⊂ C ⊥ 2 , the decoding error probability of C ⊥ 2 as a part of a CSS code is small with high probability. Consequently, we can conduct random privacy amplification with a code C 2 of a rate higher than H(p0)+H(p1) 2 .
If we estimate an error rate in a lump (test bits in each basis are lumped together and a single error rate is computed), an estimated error rate is p0+p1 2 instead of p 0 and p 1 . Thus, we can conduct random privacy amplification with a code C 2 with a rate higher than H p0+p1 2 . Since the entropy function is concave, we can conduct random privacy amplification with a code C 2 of a lower rate by estimating error rates separately, which enables us to share a longer key.
D. Comparison with Mayers' evaluation
In this section, we compare our result with Mayers'. In case of estimating an error rate in a lump, we can conduct random privacy amplification with a code C 2 of a rate higher than H p0+p1 2 . Because there exists efficiently decodeable codes whose rate is fairly close to 1−H p0+p1 2 and whose decoding error probability is small, we can securely share a key with a rate lower than 1 − 2H p0+p1 2 . With Mayers' evaluation of minimum Hamming weight of C ⊥ 2 \C ⊥ 1 in [5] , we can securely share a key with a rate lower than 1−H p0+p1 2 −H(p 0 +p 1 ), where 1 − H p0+p1 2 is the rate of C 1 for error correction and H(p 0 + p 1 ) is the rate of C 2 for privacy amplification.
According to the evaluation of the decoding error probability, we showed that the tolerable error rate can be increased from 7.5 % to 11 %. Figure 1 paper and Mayers' against error rate, and the key rate falls to 0 at the point of 7.5 % and 11 % respectively.
IV. CONCLUSION For a fixed code C 1 , we showed that we can decrease a rate of randomly chosen code C 2 , keeping the BB84 protocol to be secure. Consequently, we proved that the BB84 protocol with random privacy amplification can tolerate severer noise and can share longer keys.
